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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated (1996), as amended. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Standard of Review on a grant of a Motion to Dismiss: "...[W]e affirm only if, as matter 
of law, the Plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. And considering 
allegations in the complaint we take them as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff Golding v. Ashley 
Central Irrigation Co,, 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990) citing Lowe v. Sorenson Research 
Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
NAME OF TRIAL COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final order of dismissal by the Fifth District Court in and for 
Washington County, State of Utah, after a one-day bench trial, the Honorable Judge R. 
Beacham presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
FIRST ISSUE: Whether the District Court committed reversible error in its Finding 
of Fact (Number 6), that the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's (MFCU hereafter) 
investigation of the Plaintiff was not initiated, controlled or directed by Defendant 
Department of Health-Division of Health Care Finance Medicaid (DOH hereafter). 
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SECOND ISSUE: (District Court's Conclusion of Law; Number 3): Whether the 
District Court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, concluding that the MFCU has never 
been an agent of, a designee of, or a part of the Defendant DOH-Medicaid, and further 
concluding (Number 4) that Federal law prohibits any MFCU agency role in behalf of 
Medicaid. 
THIRD ISSUE: Whether the District Court erred in ruling, as a matter of law 
(Numbers 6,7, and 8(b)), that Medicaid's 1998-1999 conclusion of Dr. Becker's 
upcoding, [a felony under the Utah False Claims Act (UCA Chap. 20, 26-20-9], and 
transmitting this finding to the MFCU, "...did not constitute an agency action that 
imposed any duty on Defendant under the Provider Agreement." 
FOURTH ISSUE: Whether the District Court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, 
that "Defendant met all its legal and contractual duties to provide Defendant (sic) due 
process, including notice and opportunity to be heard." 
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether the District Courts interpretation of the relevant laws, 
federal regulations and statutory rules, which were preserved and presented to the Court 
during the Trial, demonstrated credible evidence that the District Court had a reasonable 
basis for its finding (Number 12): "...that Plaintiff has failed to prove any breach of 
contract by Defendant or any damages caused to Plaintiff by Defendant." 
ISSUES PRESERVED 
Conforming to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) Plaintiff/Appellant 
submits the following reference from the District Court's trial transcript (T.T. hereafter), 
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4toi'i'ii]g liiiii ilicsc issues now nn uppc<il INVC lurn i.'iised and preserved by testimony of 
witnesses and argument of counsel before the Honorable Judge Beacham during trial 
However, since the trial had been scheduled to continue the following day (T T nn 
290: 18-21; 316:23 to 318:20), additional issues JHKI Icsliinoin pertainin. .. iamages 
were anticipated to be raised at that time. However, the second day of the trial did not 
materialize due to the District Court's taking under advisement Defendant's oral Motion 
to Dismiss at (lie end of t»«. firs! da\ ol trial ( I ' / .'<») |i "M \P " f» iN^)(B». Stale v. 
Irvin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996, cert denied)]. 
1) Contrary to the District Court and Defendant's claim (T.T. 198:1-3; 199:13-21), Dr. 
Becker has nowhere abandoned hei claims that the N fFCU's activities in behalf of 
Medicaid were in the nature of an agent/designee. (See Complaint Exhibit C. 
Numbers 1,3; T.T- 164:11-20; 165: 1-2; 164:12; 168: 21; to 169: 3; 217:19; 245:13-
16). By automatically transferring Di Ba ,ka\ i; hillini' codes (mid those ol 
thousands of other physicians) - to the MFCU without the MFCU's written request 
specifically identifying the provider M.D., -Medicaid thereby initiated the MFCU's 
criminal investigation which was based solely on that supplied information. (T.T. 
164:15; 167:15-19; 168:25 et seq.; 205: 14-19; 206:4-7; 208:13-25). Defendant 
never controverted Dr. Becker's claim confirmed to her initially by MFCU 
prosecutor/counsel Assistaiil AliVniiq. (iencral Denis kmll. Ill,ill " 'full DOM's 
Division of Health Care Finance-Medicaid (DHCF hereafter) Director Mr. Michael 
Deily had initiated the investigation (T.T. 168:25-to-169:3). 
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2) Dr. Becker continues to aver that a special agency relationship of cooperation and 
collaboration between the MFCU and Medicaid exists as mandated by federal 
regulation (e.g. 42 CFR 455.21). When Medicaid chooses to use an MFCU for its law 
enforcement component, the MFCU becomes indeed a part of the Medicaid program. 
The common custom that they are "distinct' or 'separate' for their individual budget 
allocations and specified authority parameters does not proscribe a special purpose 
principal-agent relationship. While Medicaid programs exist without an optional 
MFCU, no MFCU can possibly exist without a state Medicaid program. Moreover, 
Medicaid retains ultimate control over the MFCU because they may sever their 
relationship upon 60-day notice without cause thereby terminating the MFCU's 
existence. (T.T. 216:15 to 217:19; 218:20; 219:1-6). 
3) The District Court's finding that Medicaid's early 1998-1999 disclosure to the MFCU 
which found Dr. Becker to have 'upcoded' (overtoiled) did not "...trigger any duty 
upon the Defendant...to conduct its own investigation", is not based on any fact, 
statute, rule or regulation and neither the Court below nor the Defendant have cited 
any. 
On the contrary, CFR § 455.14 and 455.21 as part of the contract unambiguously 
mandates that Medicaid "must" begin administrative action by informing Dr. Becker of 
any alleged overpayments alleged by "any" source, and request prompt restitution. (T.T. 
274:2-9; 287:10-15; 300:25-to-303:15; 306:12-16; 309:12 to 310:20). 
The mandated request for an immediate disclosure and 'prompt" repayment is not 
only in conformance with the agreement (Contact B-2) itself, but reflects public policy 
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and that of the Office of Inspector General (()l( i kit/at'lal llml *III iinlicalnJ oi puivi m 
overcharging by providers of Medicaid should be halted at once to prevent further abuse 
of the severely limited Medicaid resources intended for needy patient's medical care. 
4) For the above-stated reasons, Dr. Becker disputes the District Court's conclusions of 
h A Number 111 'Defendant met all it legal and contractual duties..." That 
conclusion simply ignores the promised - all important 'prompt' time frame for a 
preliminary examination of the allegation against a provider, prioi ) 
litigation against Dr. Becker stretching from 1998 to 2002. When the federally 
mandated preliminary administrative investigation was finally granted to Dr. Becker it 
was done after the State's dismissal (with prejudice) of the State's claim against Dr, 
llivker and led 1H H t|iiick decision exonerating Dr. Becker (T.T. 306:12-16; 308:3-10; 
310:14-to-311:13). 
Thus had Medicaid met its obligation to respond promptly it would have saved 
(our yciirs of needless litigation and hundreds of thousands of dollars expended by 
both parties. 
Dr. Becker alleges that the District Court evidenced no reasonable basis to its 
h'>ldmjL! aii-l (II'ITCM .i|hi|iisccl its discretion in its conclusion of law, resulting in an 
arbitrary and capricious decision. 
5) In recognition of Dr. Becker's preserved arguments and surprise witness testimony at 
tiial, the facts of the case and cited statutes, considering the Federal Regulations, state 
rules and the language of the written contractual agreement itself, Dr. Becker has 
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preserved abundant facts and issues justifying her Breach of Contract claim vs. 
Defendant (T.T. 309:12-to-311:13). 
The standard of review remains identical to op cit. under STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Of necessity, the following statements are largely parallel to those already 
forwarded in Dr. Becker's Motion for a New Trial and Docketing Statement, included 
as documents transferred to the Appellate Court. 
In November, 1998, Taj Becker, M.D. (Neurology) was served by the Utah MFCU 
with a facially legal Subpoena Duces Tecum in Aid of a Criminal Investigation, 
requiring her to release numerous of her private patients' medical documents (charts) 
to the MFCU. The MFCU had represented itself during settlement negotiations as 
acting in behalf of Medicaid (See Exhibit C of Complaint). Dr. Becker was advised 
by the MFCU's prosecutor and legal counsel that the Utah Department of Health-
Medicaid had initiated the criminal investigation (T.T. 169:1-4). 
The MFCU routinely downloaded Medicaid's entire provider database for coding 
analysis of medical practice billing patterns. Such misleading inconclusive data-
mining was specifically prohibited to the MFCU by CFR 42 § 1007.19(e)(2), which 
for sound reasons reserved this very difficult function to be performed by the 
medically-trained coding staff of the Medicaid program Integrity Unit (T.T. 25:12-14; 
26:106; 42 CFR §455.13). 
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I In; MM 11 iiiilfjinii il in oialit/ai i ndinu diagnoslH s and pharmacology, alleged 
that Dr. Becker's coding was at a higher level than the medical notations in her charts 
indicated and demanded immediate repayments of over $100,000 or face criminal 
charges a .• ' - - • Jus costs if she did not pay quickly. 
Later lesser and lesser amounts (down to $27,000) were demanded during MFCU 
settlement proposals prior to any charges filed in court. 
II i n II"! ' t l a tJntiec! .ill allegations ol I'milh coding .mini! immediately reqi tested that 
the MFCU share a copy of their subpoenaed medical charts containing the alleged 
miscoding with Medicaid's professionally trained experts in its Program Integrity 
I Jnit (Pit J hereafter) where she could niccl tin prompt 'burden of proof in reliance on 
the contractual promise (p. B-2 of the Contract). The MFCU did not then indicate 
that they would do so or at any time thereafter until surprisingly six years later under 
oath at trial, in September 2006. 
During that trial testimony, both MFCU counsel/prosecutor Kroll and Medicaid 
PIU Director Gatzemeier unequivocally testified that an MFCU request for a PIU 
evaluation was indeed acted upon at (lutl tunc i1W8- 1999). llowi 'ver\ the exchange 
of information between Medicaid and the MFCU incriminating Dr. Becker was kept 
from her knowledge, and its occurrence denied throughout the following years. 
Mom u.i, I )i IWK Ivu at (tic saint: hnu1 mi ir.iih l"l,'l|",»f" Ii.if) ill11 nidqiaiclaitlv 
made the same request for a preliminary investigation-hearing by self-referral to 
Medicaid's PIU which specifically employs coding experts mandated for this purpose 
by federal regulations (T.T. 25:12-14; 42 CFR § 455.12). Si ic ! i c 1; iril > ing self-
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referrals by providers on controversial coding interpretations are encouraged by 
Medicaid, which has 'educational' obligations by CFR rules for this very purpose. 
Medicaid's PIU Director Gatzemeier declined to afford Dr. Becker a preliminary 
investigation, claiming disingenuously that Medicaid was legally prevented from 
doing so until the MFCU had concluded their investigation or litigation. 
In April-May 1999 the MFCU's prosecutor/counsel, Asst. Attorney Denis Kroll, 
submitted several monetary proposals to Dr. Becker in order to settle out of court, 
prior to filing any action against her. 
The MFCU in numerous written statements always represented itself as 
'Medicaid". On May 5, 1999, Dr. Becker rejected to proposals in a letter to Mr. Kroll 
(Contract Exhibit D). 
A civil suit was then filed by State v. Becker (June 24, 1999) after she refused to 
pay the MFCU's erroneous extrapolated money demands. The civil suit was 
dismissed without prejudice shortly thereafter (July 8, 1999). 
Subsequently, a criminal action (Second Degree Felony) was filed by the State 
upon the MFCU's information on January, 11, 2000 based exclusively on the identical 
single issue of alleged wrong coding dismissed in the civil case. Medicaid PIU 
Director, Steven Gatzemeier, was listed as a witness for the State in the felony action 
against Dr. Becker. That case was likewise dismissed by the State with prejudice on 
September 6, 2000. 
Thereafter, in December 2000, approximately three years after her first requests, 
and after the criminal action's dismissal, Medicaid finally wrote Dr. Becker alleging 
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that going back several years she was overpaid by approximately $5,000, and 
demanding restitution of that sum. 
Dr. Becker contested that demand. She was only then permitted by Medicaid to 
make a written request for the previously denied hearing in answer to Medicaid's 
letter since Medicaid had informed Dr. Becker in 1999 that they could not and would 
not review her coding pending the MFCU investigation. 
Dr. Becker was thereby able to participate in her long sought administrative 
process in order to settle the coding disagreement and to clear her name. However, 
for the next one and one-half year, Medicaid's PIU was as yet unprepared to assemble 
the required administrative process and the hearing did not materialize until finally 
adjudicated in May 16, 2002, when Dr. Becker was exonerated by Medicaid's own 
Administrative Law Judge, Lambertus Jansen, and found to owe no repayments for 
alleged upcoding. 
A year previous, on May 21, 2001, Dr. Becker had already filed a Notice of Claim 
with the State alleging, inter alia, Breach of Contract by Medicaid. The State did not 
reply. 
This case on Appeal was filed by Dr. Becker v. DOH-Medicaid on August 14, 
2002. After many delays, on September 28, 2005, a scheduled one and one-half day 
trial was cut short to one day when the District Court took an oral motion made by 
counsel for the Defendant during trial under advisement. 
Defendant Medicaid requested the District Court to grand a Motion to Dismiss or 
a direct verdict. The Court did not order Memoranda on Defendant Medicaid's 
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Motion to Dismiss (T.T. 291:16-19). The District Court did not continue the trial on 
the issue of damages as scheduled for the next day. On February 3, 2006, the 
Honorable Fifth District Judge signed his Order of Dismissal, granting Defendant's 
motion without further hearing or Memoranda. 
Subsequently, on February 13,2006, Dr. Becker filed a Motion for a New Trial 
based upon heretofore undisclosed surprise trial testimony by State witnesses 
Medicaid PIU Director Steven Gatzemeier and MFCU Assistant Attorney Denis Kroll 
during trial. 
Again, despite Mr. Gatzemeier's previous years-long insistence to Dr. Becker, 
asserting that a legal prohibition barred him from reviewing her coding while the 
MFCU was investigating (T.T. 148:8-to-149:10), testimony at trial disclosed, un-
controverted by Defendant, that Medicaid had in fact, contrary to his denials to Dr. 
Becker, in "late 1998 or in early 1999", responded to an MFCU request by reviewing 
Dr. Becker's medical records and informing the MFCU that Dr. Becker had 'upcoded' 
according to his PIU staff analysis (T.T. 40:4-16). 
This critical collaboration between the MFCU and Medicaid was not disclosed in 
Dr. Becker's discovery requests from Medicaid in the case at bar. 
Medicaid and the MFCU frankly admitted that Mr. Gatzemeier's claim of inability 
to perform Medicaid's obligation to afford Dr. Becker a prompt opportunity to meet 
her burden of proof (concurrent with MFCU investigation), was based on no rule or 
law (T.T. 92:15-25; 274:2-9). 
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According to the binding federal rules, this Medicaid reported findings of 
wrongful overpayments to Dr. Becker "must" promptly trigger the CFR mandated 
preliminary investigation and hearing requested by Dr. Becker in conformance to the 
contract promises. 
Medicaid had deliberately suppressed this finding, in bad faith. This was done as 
a matter of convenience, callously and with indifference to Dr. Becker's 
administrative rights under the contract, as Medicaid passively awaited the outcome 
of litigation. If Dr. Becker had been convicted or frightened enough by threats of 
criminal prosecution to pay without an opportunity to review the specific allegations 
to meet her burden of proof, Medicaid would have received alleged money restitution 
(50% of which they later acknowledged NEVER having paid to Dr. Becker) plus very 
large penalties without having to acknowledge any involvement in the case. Such 
outcome would have been extremely desirable for Medicaid since it seeks to maintain 
the appearance of a provider friendly relationship with physicians, which are 
increasingly difficult to find for participation in the Medicaid program. 
In fact, Medicaid would have received tens of thousands of dollars of 'restitution5 
that Medicaid had admittedly never paid to Dr. Becker. 
Moreover, Medicaid's PIU Director Gatzemeier informed Dr. Becker in early 
1999, after Dr. Becker requested of him that Medicaid review her coding, that the PIU 
was under-funded and unable to perform any but the most minimal federally 
mandated post payment review of providers, less than one-half of one percent (T.T. 
152:4-19). For this and other reasons, in 1985, Medicaid had constructively delegated 
Appellate Case No. 20060495 C.A. xiii 
this crucial function to the MFCU, which had no expertise in these very difficult 
medical coding requirements (T.T. 26:6), and, unlike Medicaid, is not mandated by 
federal rule to conduct administrative reviews. This resulted in foreseeable harmful 
consequences to Dr. Becker who was given no notice of this material change to the 
contract terms, which essentially nullified promised 'prompt' administrative 
procedures 'on the lowest level' (Contract B-2, CFR § 455.14 & 455.21; Utah 
Administrative Code Rule 410-14-1; Utah Code un-annotated 63-46b-l(4)). 
The PIU's incriminating allegation to the MFCU regarding Dr. Becker, later 
conclusively adjudicated in Dr. Becker's favor as having no merit, was arrived at 
unilaterally by Medicaid, and in secret without Dr. Becker's contractually promised 
input or opportunity to provide her "...burden of proof to substantiate services 
provided to Title XIX/UMAP recipients." 
Dr. Becker's Motion for a New Trial was denied and she filed a Notice of Appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court May 19, 2006, which was transferred to the Honorable 
Utah Court of Appeals on June 16, 2006. 
Medicaid knew that its disclosure of alleged 'upcoding' would provide substantial 
impetus to the MFCU's decision to charge Dr. Becker. She was forced to spend years, 
and hundreds of thousands of dollars in her successful defense, proximately caused by 
Medicaid's refusal to allow a prompt examination of the allegation at the lowest level 
which would have settled the issue administratively some three years earlier as it 
eventually did and without litigation (T.T. 300:4-12; 274:2-9). 
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The chief issue on appeal is whether the District Court below committed 
substantial prejudicial and reversible error, by discounting the crucial early timeliness 
of the mandated preliminary review performance as Medicaid's obligation and 
covenanted duty, which is clearly memorialized in the four corners of the contract 
agreement, and additionally in the inclusive contact-defining and binding Provider 
Manual, the Federal/State Acts, Laws, Rules and Regulations upon which Dr. Becker 
had every reason and duty to rely in good faith and fair dealing. 
The DOH must take full responsibility for their lack of good faith performance. 
As the 2nd Restatement of the Law on Contract § 205 d states succinctly: 
"Subterfuge and evasion violate the obligation of good faith of performance even 
though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes 
further; bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, fair dealing may require 
more than honesty." [emphasis added] 
Neither the Defendant, DOH-Medicaid, nor the District Court, could cite a single 
law, rule or regulation, which would have prevented Medicaid from fulfilling its early 
obligation under the law. This was conceded by Assistant Attorney General Kroll and 
PIU Director Gatzemeier at trial (T.T. 42:5-to-43:22; 275:5-13). 
Apparently, the main basis of the District Court's decision was the Honorable 
Judge's finding that none of the Contract's mandated statutory or regulatory 
administrative procedures evidence a Medicaid duty to act "promptly" or at the 
"lowest level". The Court agreed with the Defendant's argument that prior to a 
written request to Dr. Becker, originating at Medicaid's discretion and demanding 
overpayment restitution from her, nothing obligated Medicaid to initiate any 
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administrative action with the participation of the accused requesting such procedure 
in writing after being civilly or criminally implicated by Medicaid. 
Dr. Becker has fully demonstrated this to be an erroneous prejudicial misreading 
of the law as cited and a substantial reversible error. 
Dr. Becker was prevented from tendering a written request for an administrative 
review on her alleged miscoding to Medicaid's PIU Director Gatzemeier upon his 
assurance to her that such request to him would be futile and legally impossible while 
the MFCU investigation was in process. He also stated that he had no knowledge of 
the MFCU's doings and had no involvement in their investigation. Both statements 
are contrary to the facts as clearly revealed at trial (T.T. 55:1-3; 44:17; 48:1-6). 
Medicaid had a principal-agent relationship with the MFCU. In the alternative, the 
MFCU was an 'apparent9 agent acting in behalf and for the benefit of Medicaid. 
Therefore, by Dr. Becker's written request to the MFCU-designee in 1998-99 for a 
concurrent preliminary administrative investigation by Medicaid-PIU on the upcoding 
charge she alleges to have made that request constructively to Medicaid itself. 
Marveon Sign Co. v. Roebuck, 694 P.2d 604 (Utah 1984): 
"If a contract is made with a known agent acting within the scope of his authority 
for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal and the agent cannot 
be held liable thereon." 
Even if the Honorable Court of Appeals sustains the lower Court's negative 
finding on the agency issue, there remains the newly discovered and un-controverted 
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fact revealed by defendant during trial that Medicaid itself communicated an 
incriminating finding to the MFCU in 1998-99. 
This fact simplifies Dr. Becker's claim of breach of contract enormously, making 
the agency claim a supporting, but not an imperative issue in the case at the bar. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(The Parties) 
Plaintiff/Appellant Taj Becker, M.D. is a practicing, licensed physician, Board 
Certified in Neurology, and she is a natural bom citizen of the United State of America 
(hereafter Dr. Becker). 
Dr. Becker completed her Bachelors (B.A.) in 1974 at the University of California, 
Berkeley; Medical School in 1978 at Creighton University of Nebraska, attended Ph.D. 
Neurosciences studies at the UCLA Brain Research Institute, completed her Neurology 
Residency and subsequent two-year Spinal Cord Fellowship at Stanford University in 
1985. After completing a locum tenens in the California Bay Area (Los Altos) she and 
her husband moved to Hawaii. 
She served there as adjunct professor of Medicine at the John Bums School of 
Medicine and maintained a private neurology practice in Hawaii until moving to St. 
George, Utah in 1994 where she has a private solo practice, served as Chief of Medicine 
at Dixie Regional Medical Center and Trustee for the Utah Medical Association. 
Defendant/Appellee is the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Finance-Medicaid (hereinafter Medicaid). The Utah Department of Health is a 
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Department of the Executive Branch of the Utah State Government. Through its Division 
of Health Care Finance, the Department of Health administers the Medicaid program, 
which is financed by the State. Utah receives a portion of this expenditure from the 
Federal Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS-Former HCFA) under the 
Social Security Act. This funding process applies also to the MFCU, which was likewise 
an entity of the Executive Branch (Department of Public Safety). Neither Medicaid nor 
the MFCU personnel are thereby agents of the federal government. 
On August 14, 2002, Dr. Becker filed this Breach of Contract case against the 
defendant in the Fifth District Court in and for Washington County, Utah (Judge G. Rand 
Beacham). 
On September 28, 2005, a bench trial was held, both parties being represented by 
counsel. Upon an oral motion to dismiss made by Defendant DOH, the court took the 
motion under advisement without reconvening the trial as scheduled and expected by Dr. 
Becker. 
On February 3, 2006, the District Court Judge signed the Order of Dismissal on 
the merits, granting defendant Medicaid's motion. 
On February 13, 2006, Dr. Becker, now pro se, filed a Motion for a New Trial. 
On April 26, 2006, that Motion was denied by the District Court. 
On May 19,2006, a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was filed by Dr. 
Becker, followed with a timely request for the full trial transcript and filing of the 
Docketing Statement with certified copies to all parties. 
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On June 11, 2006, Dr. Becker was notified that the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred her appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (20060495 S.C now 200060495 
C.A.). 
Dr. Becker submits to the Honorable Utah Appellate Court this Brief of the 
Plaintiff Appellant with certified copies to all parties. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A contract (of adhesion) existed between Dr. Becker and Medicaid-DOH. 
The four corners of that agreement significantly expanded and defined the parties 
obligations and rights by reference to the binding Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 
Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP), Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Utah 
Administrative Code Rule 410-14-1, Provider Manuals, updates, information bulletins 
and other related material (Provider Agreement: A-2, B7). 
The most specific Federal Regulations relevant to the Provider and Medicaid is the 
CFR as recognized by the Defendant (T.T. 105:14-20; 107:13-17; 109:10-18). 
In addition, the binding Provider Manual's Section 5 "PROVIDER 
COMPLIANCE AND HEARING RIGHTS" specifically addresses available 
administrative procedures and remedies for the provider physicians under Utah's 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
A time frame requiring a prompt Medicaid professional administrative preliminary 
investigation/hearing upon allegations 'from any source' relating to the extremely 
Appellate Case No. 20060495 C.A. xix 
complex medical coding issues was a contractual bargained-for promise of material 
importance to Dr. Becker. 
UCC (Utah Commercial Code) 
70A-2-210. Delegation of Performance-Assignment of Rights. (1) A party may 
perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other 
party has a substantial interest in having his original promisor perform or control 
the acts requires by the contract. No delegation of performance relieves the party 
delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach. 
Medicaid's willful and legally unsupported failure to perform this requested 
absolute duty was against fair dealing and good faith, and in breach of contract, -
forseeably damaging to Dr. Becker (Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801, Utah 
1985. 
The District Court took judicial notice of the cited relevant CFR requirements, the 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act and other DOH policies and regulations, which are 
all defining and binding parts of the contract. 
Even if Dr. Becker's earlier circumstantially compelled reliance on the AGENCY 
relationship would be found to lack sufficient merit by the Honorable Court of Appeals, 
the surprise state witness testimony at trial admitting the early 1998-9MFCU-Medicaid 
active collaboration, establishes undeniable facts to find Medicaid directly and 
independently in breach. Trial counsel for Dr. Becker adequately preserved this claim at 
trial (T.T. 301:1-6; 304: 1-6; 303:23). 
The Defendant's and District Court's failure to cite any laws or regulations in 
contradiction of the legislative intent to afford an opportunity to an aggrieved provider 
for administrative relief "...prior to or during litigation", renders the Order of Dismissal a 
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substantial and reversible error, and prejudicial to Dr. Becker (State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 
898, 902 (UT. Ct. App. 1996). 
The Trial Court's finding that Medicaid, by its refusal to comply with Dr. 
Becker's early and insistent requests for a preliminary investigation on her coding (See 
CFR § 455.14) met all its covenanted duties, - is legally and factually insufficient to 
support that finding and without a reasonable basis, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's decision (See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 
1994). 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of the contract (B-2) and 
its pertinent included CFR regulations, state acts and implicit rules, and thereby abused 
its discretion. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 871 P.2d 552, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. 19: 
[64] "Utah recognizes, as a general principle of contract law, that "every contract 
is subject to an implied covenant of good faith" Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 
P.2d 49, 55-56 (Utah 1991). Accord St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) ("covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inheres in most, if not all contractual relationships"). Furthermore, the 
violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing "gives rise to a claim of breach 
of contract." Beck v. Farmers Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). The 
state has waived immunity "as to any contractual obligation" (Utah Code Ann. 63-
30-5). 
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ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW on grant of a Motion to Dismiss: "...[W]e affirm only 
if, as matter of law, the Plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. And 
considering allegations in the complaint we take them as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff." 
Mountain Am. Credit Un. v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 
862 P.2d 1356 Utah 1993). 
POINT I: MEDICAID BY ITS MFCU AGENT INITIATED DR. BECKER'S 
CODING INVESTIGATION. 
POINT II: THE MFCU FUNCTIONED IN BEHALF OF THE UTAH 
MEDICAID PROGRAM IN THE ROLE OF A SPECIAL OR 
APPARENT AGENT 
The District Court's conclusions in denying Points I and II are so closely related 
that it is practical to examine them together. 
MARSHALLING THE PRO-COURT ARGUMENT 
Since the District Court did not cite specific law or regulations supporting its 
decision in its Order of Dismissal, Dr. Becker can only reluctantly speculate on its legal 
foundation, - in the light most favorable to the District Court, - which may have led to 
court to its finding of facts and conclusions of law. 
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Defendant Medicaid argued at trial and elsewhere that 42 CFR part V § 1007.9(a), 
(b)? (c) is dispositive of the proposition that no agency relationship could legally exist 
between the MFCU as evidenced by CFR §1007.9. 
§1007,9 Relationship to, and agreement with, the Medicaid agency. 
(a) The Unit must be separate and distinct from the Medicaid agency. 
(b) No official of the Medicaid agency will have authority to review the activities 
of the unit or to review or to overrule the referral of a suspected violation to an 
appropriate prosecuting authority. 
(c) The unit will not receive funds pain under this part either from or through the 
Medicaid agency. 
The District Court agreed: "...she [Becker] does acknowledge that at the 
beginning [filing her complaint in August, 2002] she was not correct in her assumptions 
about who was whom." (T.T. 199:13-19); and, 
"Plaintiffs confusion about the legal and functioning distinctions between 
Defendant and the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit have been the primary problem 
driving this litigation. Federal law requires the State of Utah to create the 
Medicaid Fraud Control unit, which was formerly part of the Utah Department of 
Public Safety, and is now operated by the Utah Attorney General. The Medicaid 
Fraud Control unit has never been a part of the Defendant or an agent or designee 
of the Defendant, because that is prohibited by Federal law." (December 3, 2005, 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). 
Moreover, Defense counsel had sternly questioned Dr. Becker on the witness 
stand about her comprehension of Rule 11 of the Rules of Civic Procedure. He implied 
that Dr. Becker should have understood that the obvious impossibility of an agency 
existence in this case tainted her frequent use of the term "agent" or designee in her 
complaint as arguably frivolous (T.T. 214:15 to 215:12). The district court may have 
found this argument persuasive. 
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The District Court appeared to rely on well established contract law for its finding 
that Medicaid's lack of control over the MFCU precludes agency. Moreover, the District 
Court also relied on CFR § 1007.9 which cited the separate/distinct nature of the MFCU 
precluding any "legal connection, agency or identity between Medicaid and the MFCU." 
In recognition of this, the District Court judge concluded that Dr. Becker's lengthy 
and "confused" attempts to create such agent relationship was without merit, "...the 
primary problem driving this litigation." 
In its decision for dismissal, the District Court sustained points already specifically 
argued by Defendant Medicaid's opening statement at trial, e.g.: 
1) THE MFCU has "never been part of the defendant" ".. .because that is prohibited by 
federal law." 
2) Thus, while the defendant and MFCU had concurrent jurisdiction to some degree, this 
did not make one an agent, designee or part of the other. 
3) Medicaid's providing their findings in regard to Dr. Becker's upcoding to the MFCU 
did not impose any duty on Defendant because it did not constitute an action on the 
part of Medicaid until Medicaid notified Dr. Becker of their finding and demand 
restitution years later at which time they granted her request, thereby meeting their 
obligation. 
4) Therefore, Medicaid did not initiate Dr. Becker's MFCU investigation. 
5) Consequently, Dr. Becker failed to prove any Breach of Contract or any damages by 
DOH-Medicaid. 
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As to the ramifications engendered by the surprise trial testimony from the State 
witnesses, admitting Medicaid's own earliest (1998-1000) active involvement implicating 
Dr. Becker, the District Court apparently found that fact to be of insufficient merit in that 
collaboration between Medicaid and the MFCU did not constitute an action by defendant 
and hence did not obligate Medicaid to act before they did three years later, upon a 
Medicaid letter of demand to Dr. Becker, as condition precedent required by the Utah 
Medicaid Provider Manual (1998) Section 6-13 and 6-14: 
6-13 Other Recovery of Payments 
When services for which the Medicaid program provided reimbursement cannot 
be verified by adequate records as having been furnished, or when a provider 
unreasonably refuses to provide or grant access to records as described above, 
either the Provider must promptly refund to the State any payments received by 
the Provider, or the State may elect to deduct an equal amount from future 
reimbursements. 
6-14 Administrative Review/Fair Hearing 
A provider may request an agency conference or formal hearing if dissatisfied 
with any decision made by the Division of Health Care Financing. A formal 
hearing before the Department of Health may be requested within 30 days of the 
agency action. The request for the agency conference and/or formal hearing must 
be in writing and sent to: 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
(emphasis supplied) 
The District Court pointed out at trial that there was no documentary evidence 
given of a written request by Dr. Becker (T.T. 305:22 to 306:8) until in answer to 
Medicaid's letter demand to her in December 2000. 
In addition, the Honorable District Court Judge also corrected Dr. Becker that she 
was grammatically mistaken in her erroneous interpretation of the contract's punctuation 
regarding the term 'designee', as she mistakenly claimed it pertained to the MFCU: 
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(Contract p.2 B-2) "...as the State and its designees, the Fraud Control Unit, or the 
Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) may 
request" (T.T. 246:1-3). 
Furthermore, counsel for Medicaid may have been persuasive to the Court when 
he stated at trial (T.T. 198:1-3) that "...she [Becker] acknowledges that she understood 
that we [Medicaid] have no control over MFCU". 
Counsel for the Defendant elaborated by further stating at trial that Dr. Becker had 
been unsuccessful in all her previous legal actions against the MFCU without any 
recoveries; and that she now attempts to 'bootstrap' her claim against Medicaid into a 
contract action (T.T. 8:15 to 9:25). He continued in his opening statement by arguing 
that "any implied terms are expressedly prohibited by federal law and are contrary to 
public policy" (T.T. 10:11-14). These presentations to the District Court appear to have 
been persuasively argued. Whether they played any role in the courts ultimate dismissal 
is of necessity conjectural. 
Plaintiff/Appellant now offers the following rebuttal: 
POINT I: MEDICAID BY ITS MFCU AGENT INITIATED DR. BECKER'S 
CODING INVESTIGATION. 
The District Court ruled that Defendant Medicaid did not initiate, control, or direct 
Dr. Becker's investigation by the MFCU (Findings of Fact #6). Dr. Becker consistently 
alleged that Medicaid did in fact initiate her criminal investigation by their indiscriminate 
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transfer of all of Utah's provider's medical service codes to the MFCU upon a one-time 
'give us all' request 10 years ago (T.T. 35:20 to 36:9). 
While the MFCU is legally entitled to billing code information from Medicaid, its 
contractual Memorandum of Understanding with Medicaid (1987 MOU) clearly states 
that this exchange must follow upon '^ written requests" [plural] from the MFCU (T.T. 
219:14 to 221:5; 42 CFR § Ch. IV 431.107 (b)(2)). 
Medicaid's de facto abdication in 1985 to the MFCU of its mandated post-
payment review of Medicaid providers, (CFR § 455.13 et seq., Complaint p.4, Nos. 14-17 
and Exhibit F) was the sine qua non basis for initiating the MFCU's investigation of Dr. 
Becker who was unknown and unreported to the MFCU by any other source. 
Most importantly, the MFCU has consistently held itself out to Dr. Becker as an 
agent of/or as Medicaid per se by their own written statements exhibited to the District 
Court and well known by the DOH (see Complaint Exhibit C). 
Black's Law Dictionary, citing the Agency Restatement 2d, defines: 
Apparent agent or ostensible agent. One whom the principal either intentionally 
or by want of ordinary care, induces third persons to believe to be his agent, 
though he has not either by expressly or by implication, conferred authority on 
him. A person who, whether or not authorized, reasonably appears to a third 
person, because of manifestations of another, to be authorized to act as an agent 
for such other." 
The Honorable District Court judge discounted Dr. Becker's heretofore of 
necessity much stressed agency connection alleged early in her Complaint as a 
"...confusion about the legal and functioning distinctions between defendant and the 
[MFCU]"..., holding that Medicaid did not control or was never a part of the MFCU. 
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Dr. Becker was not confused. She was justified to interpret the Medicaid Fraud 
Unit to be the law enforcement agent of the State Medicaid Program. This is especially 
true in light of the MFCU's multiple written manifestations to her, indicating that they 
acted on behest and by the authority of Medicaid itself (as preserved in the record). 
Wardlev Better Homes v. Cannon 2002 UT 99 (Utah 10/11/2002): 
[38] "[A] principal is affected with constructive knowledge, regardless of his 
actual knowledge, of all material facts which his agent receives notice or acquires 
knowledge while acting in the cause of his employment and within the scope of 
his authority, although the agent does not in fact inform the principal thereof." 
[41] "While vicarious liability is generally limited in tort cases, we have applied 
the principle of imputation of knowledge to cases lying in tort, contract, securities 
and property law." [emphasis added] 
MFCU prosecutor Kroll testified that the MFCU "...was an agent and designee of 
the [federal] OIG or Secretary of Health and Human Services..." (T.T. 266:11-21). 
Likewise, Medicaid's witness, MR. Gatzemeier, indicated that the MFCU was 
funded by the federal government (T.T. 32:2-4). 
Both statements are false and this apparently confused the MFCU and Mr. Kroll as 
to their imagined roles. The MFCU was never an agent of or directly funded by the 
federal government. While the U.S. Department of Health contributed a part of the 
monies to the state Medicaid program, these contributions enter the Utah General Fund 
and are supplemented by the State. Both Medicaid and MFCU fall under Utah's 
Executive Branch which pays/hires/fires them without any control by the U.S. Federal 
Department of Health (formerly MCFA-now CMS) or its OIG. 
Dr. Becker has disputed these serious misconceptions asserted by the defendant, 
yet they may well have been persuasive to the District Court which states in its 
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Conclusion of Law Number 4: "Federal law prohibits the [MFCU] from being the agent 
or designee of the defendant." Dr. Becker has no knowledge of such law and the court 
has cited none. 
The defendant and apparently the District Court relied chiefly on CFR Ch. V § 
1007.9 (a)(b)(c) for their proof that "...one is not the agent of the other," (Conclusion of 
Law Number 10); and therefore Medicaid could not have initiated the MFCU 
investigation by way of a nonexistent agent. 
Dr. Becker alleges that the fact: 
§ 1007.9(a) - that the unit must be 'separate and distinct' does not evidence a legal 
prohibition of a restricted and specified agency relation; 
§ 1007.9(b) - that Medicaid will have 'no authority to overrule or review the 
prosecutorial activities of the unit' is irrelevant to the case at bar. Dr. Becker never made 
such a request (T.T. 89:22-24); or 
§ 1007.9(c) - that the separate funding of the unit and of Medicaid is little more 
than a common accounting measure with no relevance to agency or apparent agency. 
POINT II: THE MFCU FUNCTIONED IN BEHALF OF THE UTAH MEDICAID 
PROGRAM IN THE ROLE OF A SPECIAL OR APPARENT AGENT 
Medicaid's PIU Director, Steve Gatzemeier, prior to trial testimony, consistently 
denied that he had any knowledge of or had any part in Dr. Becker's investigation by the 
MFCU (T.T. 22:4; 39:2-4; 40:2-5; 78:11-14). 
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Hence, Dr. Becker was compelled to assert a Medicaid-MFCU special agent 
relationship in order to document her earliest 1999 written request to the MFCU and 
thereby put Medicaid on constructive notice of her request in order to promptly engage 
Medicaid in a mandated preliminary examination of the alleged miscoding (See Exhibit 
D of Complaint; Contract p.2(B)) because Dr. Becker's very early prior requests (1998-
1999) to Chief MFCU investigator Wright, MFCU counsel/prosecutor Denis Kroll and 
Mr. Gatzemeier of Medicaid were only oral and by phone, and may possibly later not 
have been admitted as evidence. 
The obvious reason why neither the MFCU nor Medicaid admitted until under 
oath at trial that they did request and receive an early 1998-99 coding review of Dr. 
Becker's medical charts is that they were well aware that such an action would trigger a 
prompt duty upon Medicaid to write to Dr. Becker requesting repayments (Contract, B-2, 
CFR § 455;14)- thereby initiating an administrative procedure. 
Such a hearing would be concurrent with and independent of the MFCU's 
investigation. A possible favorable administrative outcome for Dr. Becker was not in the 
prosecutorial interest of the MFCU. 
As to Medicaid, which would recover any repayments (T.T. 98:9-15) plus huge 
penalties ($2,000 per line), should litigation against Dr. Becker have succeeded, their 
attitude was well stated by counsel for the defense (T.T. 315:15-16): "...its only sensible 
to say I'll let somebody else do it until I have to..." and "...she carries a burden to 
demonstrate any factual discrepancies that we're alleging until we allege them. And we 
allege them when we say, okay, now overpay" [sic] (T.T. 312:3-6). 
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Dr. Becker alleges that Medicaid did indeed initiate the criminal investigation via 
its apparent or actual MFCU agent. 
Defense counsel's averment "as a matter of policy, it is we who decide when we 
are going to initiate requests for overpayments" (T.T. 314:16-18), is disingenuous and 
ignores the clear mandate of B-2 of the contract, and of 42 CFR ch. IV § 455.14; and § 
455.21, among other rules and statutes which did not give Medicaid the option of waiting 
as a matter of convenience to the detriment of the provider-party to the contract. The 
MFCU was clearly a collaborating part of the Medicaid program in Dr. Becker's 
investigation and later litigation. 
POINT III: MEDICAID'S 1998-1999 DISCLOSURE TO THE MFCU FINDING 
DR. BECKER GUILTY OF OVERCHARGING OBLIGATED MEDICAID TO 
INITIATE A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE; 
AND 
POINT IV: MEDICAID FAILED TO MEET THE OBLIGATION IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. 
Again, counterpoints III and IV to the District Court's findings are combined here 
due to their derivative relationship. 
The District Court concluded as a matter of law that "7. Providing information to 
the MFCU did not constitute an agency action that imposed any duty on Defendant under 
the Provider Agreement." 
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This conclusion appeared to be based on the Judge's reading of the contract's 
Section B-2, upon which Dr. Becker partly relied in her breach of contract claim: 
B-2: "...Where claimed services cannot be verified by records normally used to 
substantiate billings, such as patient medical records, any payments revived by 
PROVIDER for those services will be promptly refunded to the STATE. The 
PROVIDER will accept the burden of proof to substantiate all services provided to Title 
XEX/UMAP recipients." [emphasis supplied] 
The Honorable District Court Judge was apparently not persuaded that the above-
cited paragraph (B-2) sufficed to clearly indicate an obligation for Medicaid to grant a 
provider a preliminary administrative process/hearing, or even to inform the provider of 
Medicaid's finding of her wrong upcoding (T.T. 307:24-to-309:14 et seq.; 94:4-13). 
In fact, the lower court seemed reluctant to consider those of Dr. Becker's claims 
based on the contract's binding Medicaid Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Utah State 
Acts and DOH rules not specifically cited in the four corners of the contract as 
controlling or obligating duties. 
The four corners of the contract (five pages) obligate both parties to conform inter 
alia, to Title XIX (approximately 130,000 pages) and thousands more (CFR 
approximately 3,300 pages), Provider Manual, etc. (T.T. 108:17-20; 105: 1; 105:14-20; 
109:10-18). 
Where did the judge get the notion that a written request was required? Was it 
from the Utah Administrative Procedure Act? Where did the judge get the notion that the 
MFCU was 'separate and distinct' if not from the CFR? Neither term is even named 
within the four corners of the contract. The Judge did not comment on whether there were 
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ambiguities in the contract. If there were none-then it is crystal clear that no written 
notice was required. On the other hand, if there are ambiguities then all ambiguities are to 
be resolved in favor of the contract's non-drafting party (Dr. Becker). 
Therefore, the five pages of the signed agreement merely direct Medicaid and 
Providers toward defining and comprehensive duties and obligations as elaborated in the 
CFR, etc. 
Nevertheless, from the Honorable Judge's comments during trial it is apparent that 
he had difficulties accepting the view. 
THE COURT: ".. .are you saying that is a violation of the CFR or a violation of 
the contract?" [emphasis supplied] (T.T. 300:22-24; 91:4-13; 309:12-24). 
COUNSEL for Dr. Becker responded: "I am saying that the CFR defines the 
contract..." (T.T. 300:25-to-301:l). 
Even if Dr. Becker would be restricted to prove her claims exclusively from the 
four corners of the written contract, she should prevail on the language of B-2 of the 
contract as cited above. 
The obligation to 'promptly' refund overpayments if she fails to substantiate her 
'burden of proof clearly implies a speedy time line for this process. Dr. Becker had from 
the start (1998-1999) self-referred herself to Medicaid (Mr. Gatzemeier) as an accused 
upcoder. 
Counsel for Medicaid in his opening statement averred that: "We will demonstrate 
that any implied terms, and this is important, that any implied terms are expressedly 
prohibited by federal law and are contrary to public policy." (T.T. 10:11-14). 
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However, counsel failed to cite any law to that effect. Or course, Dr. Becker 
cannot claim to know whether that statement was persuasive to District Court Judge in 
his decision to dismiss. 
In any event, the statement is without merit. 
UCA 63-30-5 cites (Notes to Decisions) well-established law: 
"Implied covenants. 
By its waiver of immunity "as to any contractual obligation, " the state is liable for 
its breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contracts. 
Brown v. Weis, 981 P.2d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The 'good wiir implied in any contract is an important public policy 
consideration, particularly in contracts made by the state. 
Moreover, Defendant Medicaid relied almost exclusively on the CFR and Utah's 
Administrative Procedure Act terms in the Provider Manual for its defense before the 
trial court without the Judge ever challenging these citations as outside the four corners of 
the contract. 
Defendant Medicaid, Dr. Becker and the contact terms themselves clearly and 
uniformly agree that these State and Federal laws, Rules and Acts are integral parts of the 
contractual Provider Agreement (T.T. 108:17-20; 109:13; 122:13 etseq.: 104:20-to-
105:20). 
On the other hand, the Honorable Judge of the District Court evidenced repeated 
reluctance to accept them as defendant's obligations, even in the light of the agreement's 
specified language: 
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P.2 Provider Contract: 
PURPOSE 
"Provide services within the scope of PROVIDER'S licensure as authorized under 
the laws of the State of Utah, in accordance with provisions of State law, including 
State regulations and standards, as amended, implementing Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act, as amended and State law implementing the Utah medical 
Assistance Program (UMAP), as amended; this agreement to become effective as 
a binding contract between the parties upon acceptance and execution by STATE 
at STATE'S business office at Salt Lake City, Utah." 
And p.2 A-2: 
STATE AGREES TO: 
"Furnish PROVIDER, upon State's acceptance and final execution of this 
agreement, current copies of relevant provider manuals I effect at the time of 
execution; and further, to furnish PROVIDER during the period of time this 
agreement is in effect, copies of relevant updates, information bulletins and other 
related materials thereto." [emphasis supplied] 
Thus it is clearly documented in the agreement contract that both parties are bound 
by all obligations and benefits contained in "State regulations and 
standards... implementing Title XIX of the Social Security Act... (UMAP)..." 
Moreover, in order to conclude that Medicaid owed Dr. Becker no duty at the time 
of her early requests the District Court ignored the clear mandate of CFR §455.14: 
Preliminary Investigation: 
"If the agency [Medicaid] receives a complaint of Medicaid fraud or abuse from 
any source or identifies any questionable practices, it must conduct a preliminary 
investigation to determine whether there is sufficient basis to warrant a full 
investigation." [emphasis supplied] 
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The court below concluded that absent a purely discretionary initiating action by 
Medicaid, such as informing the provider and demanding repayments, Medicaid has no 
duty to grant a preliminary investigation under the provider agreement (conclusion of law 
No. 7; see T.T. 146:3-to-148:7). Such preliminary investigation will always result in a 
hearing if the investigated Provider contests any miscoding* 
Obviously the trial court was not even swayed by Medicaid's PIU Director 
Gatzemeier's sworn testimony at trial when he replied to the question: 
Q. "Is it your belief that nobody has a right to any hearing or to marshall evidence 
to convince you otherwise until you - your agency actually send them a letter saying give 
us money back?" 
A. "Absolutely not. A provider has and a client has a right to file a hearing at any 
point in time that they feel they are aggrieved and we have an administrative hearing 
process to ~ to listen to that. They don't have to be notified by us that they have a 
problem. If in fact they feel that they have been unfairly treated or whatever else they can 
file based on that and we will - we will look at that and determine if in fact there is 
something we can have a hearing on" (T.T. 147:19-to-148:7). [emphasis supplied] 
The District Court had opined at that point that the state's own chief expert 
witness, PIU Director Gatzemeier's stated beliefs are essentially "irrelevant" (T.T. 
146:10-17). 
Again, Dr. Becker maintains that her requests were openly denied and only 
secretly complied with, which was of no benefit to her (Gatzemeier T.T. 172:3-to-
173:14). 
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Had she been informed of the PIU's early indication of upcoding, that information 
would have been of great value to her, possibly contributing to a settlement out of court. 
The District Court's conclusion of law that Medicaid's proactive dissemination to 
the MFCU of Dr. Becker's incriminating overcharges did not constitute a Medicaid 
action that imposed a duty on Medicaid is factually and legally unsustainable even 
recognizing the Honorable District Court's wide discretion and in a light most favorable 
to its findings and conclusions. See Kunzler v. O'Dell 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct App. 
1983). 
POINT V: PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO ESTABLISH MEDICAID'S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND DERIVATIVE DAMAGES 
Dr. Becker hereby incorporates arguments made in POINTS I through IV for 
POINT V. Even if any terms of the contract were viewed by the District Court as 
ambiguous (and the court below has not so indicated), - Dr. Becker reiterates that this 
contract is undeniable one of "Adhesion", resolving ambiguities in her favor (Complaint 
p. 10, 38-40). 
Counsel for the defense in his concluding trial statement declared: "But the issue 
is was there a contractual obligation to go any quicker than we did. They [Becker] 
pointed to nothing" (T.T. 312:25-to-313:2). 
This statement goes beyond credulity. The 'obligation to go any quicker than we 
did5 is the gravamen of Dr. Becker's case and was argued by her upon laws and 
regulations at length and throughout. 
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Likewise, counsel presented to the court that"... plaintiff has brought other 
lawsuits based on the activities of the [MFCU]. Today she has been unsuccessful on all 
of these action" (T.T. 8:15-18). 
However, Dr. Becker has brought only one such Federal suit under § 1983 on 
several constitutional issues. That case is presently on appeal to the 10th Circuit Court and 
not yet lost, but it is also irrelevant to the case at bar. In fact, the State is the only entity 
which failed to prevail in every filed suit against Dr. Becker - civil, criminal and 
eventually the administrative process. 
Dr. Becker is well aware that she seeks an appeal from the 5th District Court's 
decision and not from what counsel for DOH-Medicaid averred. Nevertheless, she cites 
these misleading statements to the court as possible influencing contributions to the 
Honorable Judge's eventual conclusions. 
The District Court's very minimal exposition of its reasons for dismissal was 
partly engendered by its busy schedule: "I do not have the time available for the drafting 
a scholarly decision so this summary explanation will have to suffice." (Judge Beacham's 
ruling, December 3, 2005); and "...having done my best to skim through the documents 
that have been put into evidence and some of the statutes... (T.T. 316:23-to-317) 
[emphasis added]. 
Dr. Becker alleges on appeal that the lower tribunal's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are insufficiently detailed to establish their foundation. See 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), Campbell v. Campell 896 
P.2d 635, 638-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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Once more, Dr. Becker is of necessity and uncomfortably relegated to conjectures 
as to the several facts and laws, which might have led the 5th District Court to its findings 
and conclusions. 
Plaintiff/Appellant Dr, Becker is not able with all diligence to find any clearly 
stated law by the District Court upon which she could marshall a reasoned answer other 
than she has by citing laws and regulations, etc., which clearly show that Medicaid 
breached the contract and by its action and inaction was the direct or proximate cause of 
very substantial damages to her which have not been argued because of the dismissal of 
her case (T.T.&: 18-21). 
CONCLUSION 
A contract of adhesions existed between DOH-Medicaid and Dr. Becker (not 
controverted by the parties). 
The contractual 'Provider Agreement9 additionally bound both parties by specific 
reference to numerous Federal and State laws, rules and regulations; provided benefits 
and established mutual obligations (not controverted by the parties). 
Dr. Becker filed a suit in breach of contract, which was dismissed by the District 
Court. She next filed a Motion for New Trial in which she pointed out new surprise 
evidence revealed at trial and material reversible errors in the District Court's decision in 
order to move the lower tribunal to reconsider. 
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Dr. Becker thereby preserved those issues as timely raised. See State v. Rudolph. 
970 P.2d 1221,1225-26,1227 (Utah 1998); State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). The motion was denied. 
In reliance on her arguments as briefed above, Dr. Becker alleges that the 
Honorable 5* District Court's finding of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to 
support its decision even when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court. See 
Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209,1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). They evidence substantial 
reversible error, prejudicial to Dr. Becker's case. The District Court's more careful 
consideration of the surprise testimony at trial should have caused the outcome to be in 
Dr. Becker's favor. 
Dr. Becker is not vague in her appeal in showing that the trial court exceeded its 
measure of discretion (Kunzler v. O'Dell) by incorrectly interpreting and applying the 
relevant CFR and other Federal and State laws and binding rules in contradiction to their 
plain language and against the clear evidence preserved in the record, see State ex rel 
J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The damages prayed for remain those of the Complaint, pp. 11-12: 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE: Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. General Damages: To restore the Plaintiff to her former position, -prior to the loss of 
business and litigation expenses foreseeably and directly caused by the material loss 
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of a benefit of the contract to which Plaintiff had every reasonable expectancy, and 
upon which Plaintiff relied. 
2. Special Damages: The Defendant's failure to mitigate the damage by performing its 
covenanted duty to furnish the Plaintiff with repeatedly requested pre-litigation 
administrative review, consequentially led to the material breach of a contractual duty 
causing substantial damage to the Plaintiffs reputation, income and entailed 
predictable physical/mental harm upon her person which was readily foreseeable by 
the defendant in this case. 
3. Such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate. 
Dr. Becker will furnish an expert witness testifying to the amount of damages. 
PlaintifI7Appellant prays that the Honorable Court of Appeals remand this case for trial 
on the contested issues. 
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ADDENDUM: 
SUPPORTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS: 
A. Medicaid Agreement B-2 
Administrative Procedure Act Excerpts 
Provider Manual 
B. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
C. RuleR410-14-l,-2,-3 
D. CFR § 1007.19(e) and (e)(2) 
E. Contract (Provider Agreement) 
F. Sec. 5 Utah Medicaid Provider Manual 
G. Ruling on Defendants Motion to Dismiss, December 5,2005 
H. Findings of Facts, Conclusion of Law and order of Dismissal February 3, 2006 
I. Denial of Plaintiffs Motion (for new trial April 26, 2006) 
J. Becker letter to A.AG Kroll 
K. Draft Settlement, Kroll-to-Becker 
L. Certificate of Service 
Plaintiff pro se, Taj Becker, M.D., 
Dated this / J day of 
Taj Becker, M.D., Plaintiff Pro Se 
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Medicaid Contract Agreement B-2: 
"...Where claimed services cannot be verified by records normally used to 
substantiate billings, such as patient medical records, any payments 
received by the PROVIDER for those services will be promptly refunded 
to the STATE. The Provider will accept the burden of proof to substantiate 
all services provided to Title XDCAJMAP recipients." 
Administrative Procedures Act 63-46-bl(4)(a) 
"(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise 
available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the 
beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer 
during an adjudicative proceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and 
interested persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or" 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) ...all adjudicative proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by 
persons other than the agency. 
1998 Provider Manual 
§ 5,210 Administrative Hearings 
State and Federal laws provide an opportunity for an administrative 
hearing to any person aggrieved of an action taken by the Department of 
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42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-99 Edition) 
Subpart A—Medicaid Agency 
Fraud Detection and Inves-
tigation Program 
§ 455.12 State plan requirement. 
A State plan must meet the require-
ments^ of §§455.13 through 455.23. 
§455.13 Methods for identification, in-
vestigation, and referral. 
The Medicaid agency must have— 
(a) Methods and criteria for identi-
fying suspected fraud cases; 
(b) Methods for investigating these 
cases that>— 
(1) Do not infringe on the legal rights 
of persons involved; and 
(2) Afford due process of law; and 
(c) Procedures, developed in coopera-
tion with State legal authorities, for 
referring suspected fraud cases to law 
enforcement officials. 
[43 FR 45262, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 48 
FR 3755, Jan. 27, 1983] 
§ 465.14 Preliminary investigation. 
If the agency receives a complaint of 
Medicaid' _fraud or abuse from
 <any 
source or identifies, any questionable 
practices, it must Conduct a prelimi-
nary investigation to determine wheth-
er there is sufficfent basis to warrant a 
full investigation. 
§455.16 Resolution of full investiga-
tion. 
A full investigation must continue 
until— 
(a) Appropriate legal action is initi-
ated; 
(b)'The case is closed or dropped be-
cause of Insufficient evidence to sup-
port the allegations of fraud or abuse; 
or 
(c) The matter is resolved between 
the agency and the provider or recipi-
ent. This resolution may include but is 
not limited to— 
(1) Sending a warning letter to the 
provider or recipient, giving notice 
that continuation of the activity in 
question will result in further action; 
(2) Suspending or terminating the 
provider from participation in the Med-
icaid program; 
(3) Seeking recovery of payments 
made to the provider; or 
(4) Imposing other sanctions provided 
under the State plan. 
5)455.21 Cooperation with State Med-
icaid fraud control units. 
In a State with a Medicaid fraud con-
trol unit established and certified 
under subpart C of this part. 
(a) The agency must— 
(3) On referral from the unit, initiate 
any available administrative or judi-
cial action to recover improper pay-
ments to a provider. 
B 
Rule R410-14. Administrative Hearing Procedures. 
As in effect on June 1, 2001 
UT Admin Code R410-14 Administrative Hearing Procedures. 
R410-14-1. j n t a d u j c t i o n ^ ^ 
(1) Division policy is to resolve disputes at the lowest level This rule is not meant to 
foreclose the Division's preference for informal resolutions through open discussion and 
negotiation between the Division and aggneved persons 
R410-14-2. Definit ions. 
(1) The definitions in R414-1 and Section 63-46b-2 apply to this rule. 
(2) In addition, as used in this rule 
(a) "Action" means a denial, termination, suspension, or reduction of Medicaid or UMAP 
covered services regarding an applicant or a recipient; or a reduction or denial of 
reimbursement for services 
(b) "Aggrieved Person" means any applicant, recipient, or provider adversely affected by 
any action or inaction of DHCF 
R410-14-3. Administrative Hearing Procedures, 
(1) All Title XIX (Medicaid) or Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) applicants, 
recipients, or providers aggrieved by any action or inaction of the Department of Health 
(DOH), Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF), may file a written request for agency 
action pursuant to 63-46b-3 and in accordance with this rule. All proceedings before DHCF, 
except as otherwise set fdrth, shall be conducted as a formal hearing. DHCF conducts 
hearings on many subjects including the following: 
c 
§1007.19 Federal financial participa-
tion (FFP). 
(ii) All establishment costs 'wil l be 
deemed made in the first quarter of 
certification. 
(e) Costs not subject to FFP. FFP is 
not available under this part for ex-
penditures at tr ibutable to— 
(1) The investigation of cases involv-
ing program abuse or other failures to 
comply with applicable laws and regu-
lations, if these cases do not involve 
substantial allegations or other indica-
tions of fraud; 
(2) Efforts to identify si tuations in 
which a question of fraud may exist, 
including the screening of claims, anal-
ysis of pat terns of practice, or routine 
verification with recipients of whether 
services billed by providers were actu-
ally received; 
(3) The routine notification of pro-
viders tha t fraudulent claims may be 
punished under Federal or Sta te law; 
(4) The performance by a person 
other than a full-time employee of the 
uni t of any management function for 
the unit, a n y ' a u d i t or investigation, 
any professional legal function, or any 
criminal, civil or administrative pros-
ecution of suspected providers; 
(5) The investigation or prosecution 
of cases of suspected recipient fraud 
not involving suspected conspiracy 
with a provider; or 
(6) Any payment, direct or indirect, 
from the unit to the Medicaid agency, 
other than payments for the salaries of 
employees on detail to the unit. 
§ 1007.21 Other applicable HHS regula-
tions. 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
part, the following regulations from 45 
CFR subtitle A apply to grants under 
this part: 
Par t 16, subpart C—Department 
Grant Appeals Process—Special Provi-
sions Applicable To Reconsideration of 
Disallowances [Note tha t this applies 
only to disallowance determinations 
and not to any other determinations, 
e.g., over certification or recertifi-
cation]; 
Par t 74—Administration of Grants; 
Par t 75—Informal Grant Appeals Pro-
cedures; 
Par t 80—Nondiscrimination Under 
Programs Receiving Federal Assist-
ance Through the Department of 
Health and Human Services, Effec-
?)&> 
42 CFR Ch. V (10-1-99 Edition) 
tuation of t i t le VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964; 
Par t 81—Practice and Procedure for 
Hearings Under 45 CFR par t 80; 
Par t 84—Nondiscrimination on the 
Basis of Handicap in Programs and Ac-
tivities Receiving or Benefiting From 
Federal Financial Assistance; 
Par t 91—Nondiscrimination on the 
Basis of Age in HHS Programs or Ac-
tivities Receiving Federal Financial 
Assistance. 
PART 1008—ADVISORY OPINIONS 
BY THE OIG 
Subpart A—General Provisions 
Sec. 
1008.1 Basis and purpose. 
1008.3 Effective period. 
1008.5 Matters subject to advisory opinions 
Subpart B—Preliminary Obligations and 
Responsibilities of the Requesting Party 
1008.11 Who may submit a request. 
1008.15 Facts subject to advisory opinions. 
1008.18 Preliminary questions suggested for 
the requesting party. 
Subpart C—Advisory Opinion Fees 
1008.31 OIG fees for the cost of advisory 
opinions. 
1008.33 Expert »opinions from outside 
sources. 
Subpart D—Submission of a Formal 
Request for an Advisory Opinion 
1008.36 Submission of a request. 
1008.37 Disclosure of ownership and related 
information. 
1008.38 Sigrned certifications by the re-
questor. 
1008.39 Additional information. 
1008.40 Withdrawal. 
Subpart E—Obligations and Responsibilities 
of the OIG 
1008.41 OIG acceptance of the request. 
1008.43 Issuance of a formal advisory opin-
ion. 
1008.45 Rescission, termination or modifica-
tion. 
1008.47 Disclosure. 
Subpart F-^Scope and Effect of OIG 
Advisory Opinions 
1008.51 Exclusivity of OIG advisory opin-
ions. 
1008.53 Affected parties. 
D 
PROVIDER AGREEMENTS^ 
A Provider Agreement regarding participation in both the Title XIX (Medicaid) and the Utah 
Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) is attached. 
Please sign and return the agreement promptly to assure our continued compliance with federal 
and state requirements for uniform provider agreements. .MEDICAID CANNOT ACCT 
ANT AGREEMENT THAT HAS BEEN ALTERED OR CHANGED IN ANY WAY. 
Please return the signed agreement and any application "^ferials to: 
Provider Enrollment 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Bureau of Medicaid Claims Processing 
POBox 16520 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84116-0520 
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PROVIDER ^PUCATION AND AGKKEMENT 
WHEREAS by separate application containing relevant licensure and supporting information 
'hereof, a request has been made and is now on file by the -within named Provider for 
ualification and acceptance of Provider as a Medicaid/UMAP Provider; 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
Tnis agreement is entered by and between the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing, hereinafter referred to as the STATE, and the following individual, partnership 
or corporation, hereinafter referred to as the PROVIDER. 
PURPOSE 
Provide services within the scope of PROVIDER'S licensure as authorized under the laws of the 
State of Utah, in accordance with provisions of State law, including State regulations and 
standards, as amended, implementing Title XDC of the Social Security Act, as amended, and 
State law implementing the Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP), as amended; this 
agreement to become effective as a binding contract between the parties upon acceptance and 
execution by STATE at STATE'S business office at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A. STATE AGREES TO; 
1. Pay PROVIDER for services furnished to Medicaid/UMAP recipients in 
accordance with the fee schedule in effect at the time the services are rendered 
as established under State law, regulations, methods and procedures; and, as 
appropriate, in accordance with the Social Security Act and federal implementing 
regulations and directives; with, as used herein, the term "Billed Charges" 
meaning the usual and customary charges to the general public for such services. 
2. Furnish PROVIDER, upon State's acceptance and final execution of this 
agreement, current copies of relevant provider manuals in effect at the time of 
execution; and further, to furnish PROVIDER during the period of time this 
agreement is in effect, copies of relevant updates, information bulletins and other 
related materials thereto. 
B. PROVIDER AGREES TO: 
1. Provide sendees to eligible Title XDC/UMAP recipients regardless of sex, race, 
creed, color, national origin, age, or handicap. 
2. Main tain all records for a minimum of five (5) yean (or until all audit questions 
have been resolved) that are necessary to disclose fully the extent of all services 
related to billed charges provided to individuals under Utah's Title XIX/UMAP 
programs and furnish all required information regarding any payments claimed 
for providing such services as the State and its designees, the Fraud Control Unit, 
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or the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) may request. Where claimed services cannot be verified by records 
normally used to substantiate billings, such as patient medical records/ any 
payments received by the PROVIDER for those services will be promptly 
refunded to the STATE. The PROVIDER will accept the burden of proof to 
substantiate all services provided to Title XIX/UMAP recipients. 
3. Submit within thirty-five (35) days of the date of request by the Secretary of HHS 
or the Medicaid/UMAP agency, full and complete information abdut: 
(a) The ownership of any subcontractor with whom the PROVIDER has had 
business transactions totaling more than $25,000 during the 12 month 
period ending on the.date. af.request^.and, 
(b) Any significant business transactions between the PROVIDER and any 
whoUy owned supplier or between the PROVIDER and any subcontractor, 
during the 5-year period ending on the date of request. 
4. Disclose to the STATE any person who has ownership or control interest in the 
PROVIDER, or is an agent or managing employee of the PROVIDER that has 
been convicted of a criminal offense related to that persons involvement in any 
program under Medicare, Medicaid, UMAP, or the Title XX services program 
since the inception of those programs. 
1 Act as an independent contractor, and as such, shall have no authorization, 
express or implied, to bind the State of Utah or the STATE agency to any 
agreement, settlement, liability or understanding whatsoever, nor to perform any 
acts as agent for the State of Utah, except as herein expressly set forth in this 
agreement. 
o. Accept payment by the STATE as payment in full for Medicaid/UMAP covered 
services. 
7, Agree to be bound by all provisions of federal and or state law implementing 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and/or UMAP, as amended, including all 
state regulations and standards, as amended from time to time, as presently in 
force and effect at the time of final execution of this agreement, and all 
amendments thereto hereinafter passed and approved, including all relevant 
provider manuals, updates, information bulletins and other related materials 
thereto, including but not limited to CPT~code changes and/or other uniform 
coding systems now in effect or hereinafter authorized by the STATE. 
S. And, by these presents, acknowledges that upon STATE'S acceptance and final 
execution of this agreement, that STATE will assign and forward to PROVIDER 
a specific Medicaid/UMAP Provider Number, and that PROVIDER agrees to file 
and process all claims for services rendered under this agre£rtfent utilizing said 
specific Medicaid/UMAP Provider"Number only. 
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9. And, by these presents, acknowledges that upon STATE'S acceptance and final 
execution of this agreement, and the assignment and forwarding of the specific 
Medicaid/UMAP Provider Number as set forth in Section B.8, immediately 
above, that: 
(a) As concerns a non-previously participating Medicaid/UMAP provider, as 
determined by the revision date of the present, agreement, STATE will 
forward to such non-previously participating provider a current copy of 
all relevant provider manuals, updates, information bulletins and other 
related materials thereto, in effect at the time of STATE'S final execution; 
and further, that said non-previously participating provider, upon receipt 
of said Medicaid/UMAP Provider Number, provider manuals, and other 
related materials,, agrees Jo .notify STATE.in writing immediately should 
said aforementioned manuals and/or related materials be incomplete and/or 
absent. 
(b) As concerns a presently participating Medicaid/UMAP provider, as 
determined by the revision date of the present agreement and upon receipt 
of said Section B.8 notification and forwarding of said Medicaid/UMAP 
Provider Number, such presently participating provider agrees to notify 
STATE in writing immediately as to the incompleteness and/or absence, 
if any, of relevant provider manual materials, and/or other related 
materials, then in the possession of said presently participating provider. 
C. BOTH STATE AND PROVIDER AGREE: 
1. That STATE under the terms of this agreement is acting solely in the capacity as 
a source of reimbursement and funding under the auspices of federal and state 
medical assistance programs. 
Therefore STATE is In no way guaranteeing the level of and/or quality of 
services rendered by PROVIDER under the terms of this application and 
agreement. 
That as such PROVIDER agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the STATE and 
its officers, agents, and employees from arid against any and all loss, damages, 
injury, liability and claims therefore, including claims for personal injury or 
death, and damages to personal property which the STATE is found legally 
obligated to pay solely because of acts or omissions of PROVIDER or any 
employee of PROVIDER and/or party under contract with PROVIDER, arising 
under the terms of this agreement. 
Further, both parties hereto agree to bear their own reasonable attorney's fees 
and/or litigation expenses resultant in any such action or actions brought in 
reLation thereto. 
2. That both parties will be bound by and comply with federal and state law 
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regarding confidentiality of records and recipient rights of privacy regarding the 
Title XIX/UMAP programs, 
3. That this agreement shall be effective for a period of one (1) year with automatic 
one (1) year extensions thereafter, unless sooner terminated, with or without 
cause, by either parry serving not less than thirty (30) days written notice on the 
other party of intent to terminate. In the event of termination, payments shall be 
made for services rendered up to and including the date of termination. 
4. That this agreement replaces any and all previous agreements currently in force, 
which are hereby terminated upon final execution thereof. 
I hereby certify that I have rtad and will.be bound by the terms of this-agreement and the herein 
above referenced and incorporated manuals, updates, bulletins and related materials, and all 
amendments thereto passed and approved during thej>eriod pf time this agnyment is in effect. 
Tj/pc or Print Provider Name JU 
6 % I \ ^) I 
SEP 2 9 1994 
Signature of Provider 
PROVIDER F/HJ= 
Dale: J/W?^ 7—T 
The above and foregoing is hereby accepted and approved; and the following Medicaid/UMAP 
Provider Number is assigned to the aforementioned.providen.. 
SlWt\5&Ch1. 
Medicaid/UMAP Provider Number 
Utah State Department of Health, 
Division Of Health Care Financing 
"
r




Signatwe of Authorized Parry Q 
Date: OCT 0 5 1994 
•*•++*+ 
Revision Date: 02/05/33 
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Page 5*2 I s sued 
O c t o b e r 1 , 1987 
HAH 0ZDICA1D PEOVIDEE MA2JUJLL — ALX i-Jtuviuuu 
5 . 1 0 0 General Information 
5.HO Provider Agreement 
k. Each Prov ider must execute a Provider agreement be fore he/she i s 
au thor i s ed t o furn i sh Medicaid s e r v i c e s . For informat ion 
concerning t h e current prov ider agreement, p l e a s e contac t the 
Provider F i l e Coordinator a t (801) 538-64 73 or w r i t e to us at: 
Bureau of Medical Payments 
P.O. Box 16580 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84116-0580 
3, Upon the S t a t e ' s acceptance and f i n a l e x e c u t i o n of t h e provider 
agreement, t h e S t a t e w i l l forward to each p r o v i d e r a unique 
prov ider number and a current copy of the Medicaid Provider 
Manual. In a d d i t i o n , each provider w i l l p e r i o d i c a l l y receive 
Medicaid Informat ion B u l l e t i n s and r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l s from the 
S t a t e . 
C. The p r o v i d e r must process a l l claims for s e r v i c e s us ing h i s /her 
unique p r o v i d e r Txzsber on ly . The provider must a l s o abide by 
the p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e XH of the Soc ia l S e c u r i t y A c t , as 
amended, and any re l evant S t a t e and Federal law, inc luding rules 
and r e g u l a t i o n s , t h i s Provider Manual, Medicaid Information 
B u i l e r i n s , and r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l s , inc luding , but no t l imited t o , 
HCPCS and/or CPT-4 codes and any other uniform coding systems 
a u t h o r i s e d by the S t a t e . 
5.120 B i l l i n g P r a c t i c e s 
JL The p r o v i d e r may b i l l only for s e r v i c e s t h a t are 
m e d i c a l l y / c l i n i c a l l y i n d i c a t e d and n e c e s s a r y . 
S. The p r o v i d e r must use Medicaid forms to b i l l f o r s e r v i c e s b i l l e d 
t o Medicaid ( s e e Sec t ion 3*000)^ 
C. The p r o v i d e r ' s charge s h a l l not exceed the u s u a l and custoaary 
r a t e s b i l l e d t o -the general pub l i c ( inc luding i n d i v i d u a l pat ient 
a c c o u n t s or t h i r d - p a r t y payer accounts) . 
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UTIH MEDICAID ?EOVIDE£ MASUAL — ALL PROVIDERS 
Except as may be permitted in Section 2, a provider s h a l l not 
b i l l any Medicaid r e c i p i e n t for any covered Medicaid s e r v i c e s . 
Prov iders s u s t accept the Medicaid payment as payment in f u l l . 
(Tf a p r o v i d e r r e c e i v e s a third parcj payment and does not b i l l 
Medicaid f o r the balance because he/she a n t i c i p a t e s the Medicaid 
payment t o be r e r o , t h i s s h a l l be interpreted as payment in 
f u l l , and the provider s h a l l not b i l l the r e c i p i e n t . ) 
In c e r t a i n c i rcumstances , a provider nay b i l l a r e c i p i e n t for 
r,crrv-covered s e r v i c e s . However, the recipient, r u s t be advised 
prior co r e c e i v i n g a non-covered service that Medicaid w i l l not 
pay for t h e s e r v i c e and the r e c i p i e n t w i l l be p e r s o n a l l y 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the payment. In addit ion, p r i o r to r e c e i v i n g a 
non-covered s e r v i c e , there must be an agreement in w r i t i n g between 
the p r o v i d e r and the r e c i p i e n t regarding the s e r v i c e and the 
anount t o be paid by the r e c i p i e n t . Without w r i t t e n agreement, 
the p r o v i d e r nay net b i l l the r e c i p i e n t , even i f the provider 
chooses n o t to b i l l Medicaid. Further, the r e c i p i e n t ' s ID card 
nay not be he ld by the provider as guarantee of payment by the 
r e c i p i e n t , nor nay any other r e s t r i c t i o n s be p laced upen the 
r e c i p i e n t . 
5.130 Record Keeoinr and D i s c l o s u r e 
A. The provider must maintain for a nininun of f ive (5) years, all 
records, necessary to document and disclose fu l ly the extent o: ai l 
services provided to Medicaid recipients which were b i l l e d , 
charged or reported to the State under Medicaid. 
B. The provider must promptly disclose or furnish, upon request, a l l 
information regarding any payment ciained for providing Medicaid 
services and any other information or records necessary to 
ascertain, d i s c l o s e , or substantiate ai l actual income received or 
zxperisjSLS mcurrec m providing Medicaid services to recipients , or 
in providiHg^services of the same nature during the same period as 
Medicaid s e r v i c e s , as the State and i t s designees, the Fraud 
Control Uni t , or the Secretary of the United Spates I>epiartment of 
Health and Human Services may request. 
C. The provider must allow State and Federal auditors and program 
reviewers to have access to i t s records, including a l l financial 
records for audit review and inspection, on request. 
on i 10 
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1. To allow for reasonable inspection and audit of f inancial or 
rec ip ient records for non-Tit le XII recipients to the extent* 
necessary to verity usual and customary cxrpezises and charges, 
2. Request for access to or inspection of documents and records 
rust be promptly and reasonably complied with, and free access 
co a provider's records and fac i l i t y at reasonable times and 
places must be granted to the agents of the State . Providers 
oust not obstruct any* audit or investigation including the 
relevant questioning of employees of the provider. 
2. Where s erv i ce s , for which the Medicaid Program provided 
reimbursement, ^annot be verified by adequate records as 
having been furnished, or where a provider unreasonably 
refuses to provide nr grant access to records as described 
above, any_ paymrats received by the j?rovider *°*l-sy^*L 
undocuaented services w i l l be .gggcgtly refunded to the State, 
or the State may e l e c t to deduce an equal amount from future 
4. Repeated refusal to provide or grant access to the records as 
described above wi l l resu l t in the termination of the existing 
Medicaid Provider Agreement. 
The providerjeust promptly refund_to the_State^ anyjpayments 
received-for c lawed services which cannot be ver i f ied by records 
normally used to substantiate b i l l ing , such as patient medical 
records. If such payments are not promptly refunded, the State 
may e l e c t to deduct them from future reimbursement. The provider 
sha l l accept the burden of proof to substantiate a i l servizzs 
provided to Medicaid rec ip i en t s . 
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5.200 Hearings 
.210 administrative Hearings 
State andFedera^ iavs^^ * o r a n administrative 
he*Hn£HtlPaiiy~ vers on aggrieved of an action taJcen^b^jj^^I^j^^TOJr 
&f Health (DOH) • Division of Health C*re Financing (DHCF). 
5.220 Hearing Recuests 
JL. A r^^wggi £or an administrative hearing mast be submitted within 
thirtyflcjojl days from the the date written notice of an intended 
action i s mailed by DHCF* A request for a hearing must be in 
writing and should expiaia the reasons for which the hearing i s 
requested. I t should be forwarded, as instructed in the notice t 
to the agency which sent to the provider the notice of the action 
DHCF intends to take. Failure to submit a timely request for a 
hearing wi l l const i tute ftJS^ggF, °~ tSe provider' s hearing rights. 
B. Each request for a hearing must include: 
1. The legal and factual i ssues the aggrieved person wants to 
discuss; 
<2* ^§*~S2££ific *cts or omissions of('DHCFj including a l l 
pert inent dates, names, e t c . , which give r ise to the issue(s) 
the aggrieved person wants to contest; 
3 . The r e l i e f the aggrieved person wants to obtain through a 
hearing; 
4. The laws* ru les or regulat ions relied upon by the aggrieved 
person to .support his /her pos i t i on as to the i s sues and re l i e f 
sought to he considered. 
C* Copies of current administrative hearing procedures may be 
reviewed or obtained at the Div is ion of Health Care Financing. 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT E 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STAT: 
TAJ BECKER, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 020501574 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before me for trial on September 28, 2005. The parties were present and 
represented by their respective counsel of record. Prior to the trial, the parties entered several pre-
trial stipulations regarding the evidence and the issues. 
At the trial, counsel made their opening statements, and Plaintiff called three witnesses and 
introduced several documents into evidence. Plaintiff rested, and Defendant moved to dismiss. 
Counsel made their arguments, and I took the matter under advisement. 
I have now reviewed the testimony and exhibits, have considered the parties' arguments, and 
have reviewed the law governing the issues presented by Plaintiffs claims and Defendant's motion 
to dismiss. I have decided to grant the motion. I do not have time available for drafting a scholarly 
decision, so this summary explanation will have to suffice. 
1. The Provider Agreement (Exhibit 1) does evidence a contract between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit is not a party to that contract. 
2. Plaintiffs confusion about the legal and functioning distinctions between Defendant 
and the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit has been the primary problem driving this litigation. Federal 
law requires the State of Utah to create the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, which was formerly part 
of the Utah Department of Public Safety, and is now operated by the Utah Attorney General. The 
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit has never been part of the Defendant or an agent or designee of the 
Defendant, because that is prohibited by federal law. The Defendant's provision of information to 
the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, pursuant to the Defendant's legal obligation to provide such 
information upon the request of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, did not alter the Provider 
Agreement or create a legal connection, agency or identity between the Defendant and the Medicaid 
Fraud Control Unit. 
3. To a degree, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and the Defendant have concurrent 
jurisdiction to investigate allegations of Medicaid fraud by health care providers like Plaintiff. This 
fact does not make one the agent of the other. The investigation of Plaintiff by the Medicaid Fraud 
Control Unit was not initiated by the Defendant, controlled by the Defendant, or directed by the 
Defendant. That investigation did not implicate any contractual obligation of the Defendant to 
Plaintiff, nor did it trigger any duty for the Defendant either (a) to hold an administrative hearing 
with Plaintiff regarding the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's investigation or (b) to conduct its own 
duplicative and concurrent investigation. 
4. When the Defendant did undertake an investigation of Plaintiff, the Defendant met 
its legcil duties to provide Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
5. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear to me that 
Plaintiff has failed to prove any breach of contract by the Defendant or any damages caused to 
Plaintiff by the Defendant. 
2 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed on the 
merits. Defendant's counsel shall submit findings of facts and conclusions of law, together with an 
appropriate judgment of dismissal. 
Dated this OCA day of December, 2005, 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this Oil day of \$Jy , 2005,1 provided true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RULING to each of the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in such 
attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by 
placing
 a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Michael N. Martinez 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lyle Odendahl 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O.Box 141000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1000 
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LyleOdendahl(#4103) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff (#4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
PO BOX 141000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1000 
Telephone: (801) 538-6878 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAJ BECKER, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 020501574 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter was tried before the court on September 28, 2005 The parties were present 
and represented by counsel. Prior to the trial, the parties entered several pre-trial stipulations 
regarding the evidence and the issues. 
At the trial, counsel made their opening statements, and Plamtih called three w imesses 
and introduced several documents into evidence. Plaintiff rested, and Defendant moved to 
dismiss. Counsel argued the motion to dismiss at that time. 
H 
The court, having reviewed the testimony and exhibits, considered the parties' arguments, 
and reviewed the law governing the issues presented by Plaintiffs claims and Defendant's 
motion to dismiss, and being fully advised in this matter, enters the following: 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff signed a document entitled "Joint Utah Medicaid/Utah Medical 
Assistance Program (UMAP) Provider Application and Agreement" (Provider Agreement), 
which Defendant accepted to enroll Plaintiff as a provider for Utah Medicaid and the Utah 
Medical Assistance Program. 
2. The Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit is not a signatory to the Provider 
Agreement. 
3. The Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit investigated Plaintiff for alleged over 
billing. 
4. The Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit obtained data from Defendant pursuant to 
Defendant's legal obligations under federal law, which the Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
used to identify Plaintiff for investigation. 
5. During the Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's investigation Plaintiff requested 
that the Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit to request that Defendant review the Utah Medicaid 
Fraud Control Unit's initial determinations. Defendant reported to the Utah Medicaid Fraud 
Control Unit that there was possible fraud. 
6. The Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's investigation of Plaintiff was not 
initiated by Defendant, controlled by Defendant, or directed by Defendant. 
7. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit brought and then dismissed of a civil complaint 
and subsequently brought and then dismissed of a criminal complaint a criminal action against 
Plaintiff. Thereafter, the Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit referred the alleged over billing to 
Defendant. 
8. After review of the referral from the Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, 
Defendant demanded that Plaintiff repay alleged overpayments. 
9. Plaintiff requested that Defendant conduct an administrative action to allow 
Plaintiff to contest the alleged overpayments. 
10. Pursuant to Plaintiffs request, Defendant conducted an administrative proceeding 
at which Plaintiff contested the alleged overpayments. 
11. Defendant determined pursuant to the administrative proceeding that Plaintiff 
owed no reimbursement to Defendant because of the alleged overpayments. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Provider Agreement established a contractual relationship between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. 
2. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit is not a party to the Provider Agreement. 
3. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit has never been an agent of, a designee of, or a 
part of the Defendant. 
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4. Federal law prohibits the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit from being the agent or 
designee of the Defendant. 
5. Defendant was obligated by federal law to provide data to the Medicaid Fraud 
Control Unit to assist the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in conducting the Unit's independent 
investigation. 
6 Providing information to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and reviewing its 
initial determinations did not alter the Provider Agreement or create a legal connection, agency, 
or identity between Defendant and the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit. 
7.. Providing information to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and reviewing its 
initial determinations did not constitute at agency action that imposed any duty on Defendant 
under the Provider Agreement. 
8. The Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's investigation of Plaintiff did not trigger 
or create any duty, under the contract or otherwise, for Defendant to either (a) hold an 
administrative hearing regarding the Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's actions, or (b) to 
conduct its own duplicative and concurrent investigation. 
9. The Utah Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's investigation of Plaintiff did not 
implicate, give rise to, or trigger a contractual obligation by Defendant to Plaintiff. 
10. Defendant and the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit have concurrent jurisdiction to 
inyestigate allegations of Medicaid fraud, however one is not the agent of the other. 
4 
11. Defendant met all its legal and contractual duties to provide Defendant due 
process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
12. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this court 
rules that Plaintiff has failed to prove any breach of contract by Defendant or any damages 
caused to Plaintiff by ueienaant. 
WHEREFORE, the court orders that Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and 
Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
Dated thiscj^vday of T&W . 2006. 
G. Kand Beacham, Judge 
Approved as to form: 
kdin 
Michael N. Martinez 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
REQUEST TO SUBMIT FORMANg/OR ORDER _ 
TO' Judge James L Shumate 
/K, Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Judge Eric A, Ludfow 
Re: Case N o . Q ^ o S Q | S Jcj 
Plaintiff - B ^ c k - C T 
° 0 
On the / < £ day of f) p f i | 
attorney for Plaintiff 
attorney for Defendant 
y other/prose 
The fo l lowing are submitted for decision; 
„ Pla's Deffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Pla's Def's Motion for Judgment on Pleadings 
m Pla's Def's Motion to Dismiss Continue 
Defendant: t f o g k 1 > f + . ^ ti^ H K 
_, 200 (${ Request to Submit was filed b y 
Compel 
j- Pla's 
X . Pla's 
_Def's Objection to 
.Def's Other m o - V \ OY^ V f r C H f c / J l P i c i ( 
COURTS RULING: 
Set Hearing Approximate Lengthy 
Other: 
VjC twk t tA o Sacc ^~~3~OT Q^\A\^? c\^S{ ^-(c -Ofo 
Dated this ^ ( e day of (pS $ <r \ \ j 2 0 0 ^ 
T 
y v ^ v SJC^V 
District Court Judge 
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TAJ N. BECKER, M.D. 
Neurology 
Diplomate, Ameripan Board of Psychiatry and Neurology 
630 South 400 East, Suite # 102 
St Qeorge, UT 84770 
phone (801) 688-7800 /fax (801) 688-7801 
7/7/99 
Mr. J. Denis Kroll 
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
State of Utah 
5272 S. College Dr #200 
Murray, UT 84123-2611 
Dear Mr. Kroll: 
This is to inform you that I have decided NOT to settle the legal action initiated against 
me by the State of Utah arising from the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's criminal 
investigation of my medical practice upon careful review of your latest proposal dated 
6/24/99 
I am fully aware of the loss of time and the many tens of thousands of dollar expenses I 
will incur if you choose to litigate. Nevertheless, the ramifications of the MFCU's false 
accusations against me are of such serious nature that it would very likely irreparably 
impair my continuing the practice of medicine if left unchallenged. 
If you will not dismiss this action, or refer your findings back to the Utah Health Care 
Finance Administration for evaluation and non-criminal resolution between that Agency 
and myself, I have no reasonable alternative but to await your filing of charges before the 
proper court where I am confident to have a fair hearing of the matter in controversy. 
Taj N. Becker, M.D 





J. DENIS KROLL - 1858 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utan 
5272 College Drive, #200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801)284-6253 
DRAFT 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
TAJ N. BECKER, M.D. , M e d i c a i d 
P r o v i d e r No- 570904533002, 
Defendant, 
STIPULATION OF PARTIES 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE OF~ CLAIMS, 
CONSENT TO JUDGMENT 
Civil No, 
RECITALS 
1. The Parties, The parties to this Settlement; Agreement 
are State of Utah, Medicaid Fraud Unit,("Medicaid"), and Taj N. 
Becker, M,D., ("Becker"), and make their general appearance before 
the court. 
2. Claims Submitted. As a participating Medicaid provider, 
Becker submitted or caused to be submitted claims for reimbursement 
for medical benefits provided to Medicaid patients under the 
Medicaid Program as administered by the State of Utah between 
K 
January 1, 1995, through October 31, 1998, (the audit/investigation 
period). In early 1998, Becker changed billing procedures,'that 
have apparently corrected the overpayment problem (false claims) 
that existed during the audit/investigation. 
3. Audit/Investigation. Medicaid has conducted an 
audit/investigation of the claims Becker submitted or caused to be 
submitted during the audit period. Medicaid has determined that 
claims for reimbursement*were submitted for services at a higher 
level than the actual services provided. As a-.result, Becker 
received money to which she was not entitled (overpayment). 
4. No. Intent. Becker assets that there was no 
intentional, improper, false or wrongful billings under §i26-20-
7(1), (2) (b) , False Claims Act, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended),. 
TERMS OF AGREEMENT 
5. Purpose. In accordance with the mutual covenants and 
agreements herein and with full authority to be bound thereby and 
in order to avoid the uncertainty and expense of litigation, the 
parties compromise and agree as follows: 
6. Restitution, Costs of Investigation and Penalty^ 
Becker will pay to the State of Utah $49,605.00. This payment 
includes full restitution by Becker of any and all overpayments 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /'G day of drCAn , 2006, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT TAJ BECKER, M.D., 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth, District Court in and for Washington, County, 
State of Utah - the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, 
Civil No. 020501574/Appellate Case No. 20060495 C.A 
was mailed, postage prepaid Certified Mail with Return Receipt Requested, to the 
following: 
Lyle Odendahl (#4103) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Mark Shurtleff(#4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 141000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1000 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
Tel: (801) 538-6878 
Fax:(801)538-6306 
Hand Delivered 
Mailed, overnight delivery 
Faxed 
Taj Backer, M.D., Pl^ Mtiff Pro Se 
Appellate Case No. 20060495 C.A. 
